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INTRODUCTION
During its 1999 Term the Supreme Court heard a case directly
involving the status of Native Hawaiians for the first time in its
* The Native Hawaiian word Ea is often translated as "sovereignty," but the term
encompasses more that the traditional Western notion of sovereignty.The concept of Ea in
the Hawaiian state motto, "Ua Mau Ke Ea 0 Ka 'Aina I Ka Pono" (translated as "The
sovereignty of the land is perpetuated in justice") includes not only notions of sovereignty,
but also the essence of Native Hawaiian life, which is intertwined with the land, 'aina, as
well. See generally Troy M.Yoshino, Voting Rights and the Native Hawaiian Sovereignty Plebi-
scite, 3 MICH.J. RAcE & L. 475 (1998). By convention, this article uses the term sovereignty,
but in doing so intends to evoke the full meaning of Ea.
** Olin Fellow in Law, Economics, and Business, 1665 Harvard University
Native American Fellow, and KPMG Fellow, Harvard Business School. I would like to
thank Professors Rob Williams, Lani Guinier, and Charles Fried for their input during the
development of this article. Also invaluable was the input of Laura Lehuanani Yim and
Randall Wayne Kekoa Quinones-Native Hawaiian members of the Harvard University
Native American Program.
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history.' At issue was participation in the election of the board of trustees
of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), an agency that administers pro-
grams benefiting two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry: "Hawaiians" and
"Native Hawaiians." '2 The Hawaiian State Constitution limited the right
to vote for the nine OHA trustees and the right to run in the statewide
election for the position of OHA trustee to those two subclasses. 3 The
Court held that because the definitions of these subclasses were racial
rather than political in nature, the voting restrictions violated the Fif-
teenth Amendment.
At first glance it appears that the rights of yet another group of in-
digenous inhabitants of this nation were trampled upon. A closer
inspection of the case reveals, however, that the Native Hawaiians were
instead victims of a constitutionally faulty remedial infrastructure that was
based on their race rather than their inherent sovereignty as indigenous
people. The crux of the majority opinion was that the voting restrictions
were both racially defined and imposed by the State, and thus were con-
stitutionally impermissible.' Although the majority opinion does not
elucidate acceptable alternatives, it implies that had the voting restrictions
been based on membership in a Native Hawaiian political entity, and had
that entity, rather than the State of Hawaii, been the administrator of the
resources controlled by OHA, it is likely that the outcome would have
been favorable to the Native Hawaiians. The constitutional defect identi-
fied by the majority was not an attempt to provide a measure of self-
determination for Native Hawaiians but rather a faulty infrastructure that
attempted to promote such self-determination as a function of race under
the auspices of the State.
How this faulty infrastructure arose is in large part a function of his-
tory.Writing in dissent,Justice Stevens correctly admonished the majority
that a proper decision required an understanding of the history of Native
Hawaiians. 5 As Professor Frickey notes: "In federal Indian law, lawyerly
analysis that is devoid of broader historical and theoretical perspectives
leads to misleading conclusions about the determinacy and substance of
1. The history of Hawaii did play a role in two prior Supreme Court decisions:
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding statute intended to correct
certain perceived evils of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii) and Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (takings case involving ancient Hawaiian fishpond), but
the status of Native Hawaiians was not at issue in either case.
2. The statutory definitions of these two subclasses are racially defined. See infra Part
III, note 108 (quoting HAw. R.Ev. STAT. § 10-2 (2000)). Both out of respect and for the sake
of convention, the author will capitalize Native Hawaiians throughout this paper, except
where a statute or quotation uses an alternative capitalization.
3. See HAw. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
4. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495,521-22 (2000).
5. See id. at 534. (Stevens,J, dissenting).
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what the law 'is' [or 'was'] at any given moment " '6 Part II of this Article
therefore reviews the history of Native Hawaiians in the broader context
of the history of federal Indian law,7 focusing on the vacillating congres-
sional policies regarding Indians and how those policies almost always
treated Indian tribes as political entities rather than ethnic communities.
Part III reviews and analyzes the procedural history of the Rice case and
its resolution by the Supreme Court. Part IV concludes with the argu-
ment that constitutionally-permissible alternative methodologies exist for
accomplishing the same objective of self-determination for Native Hawai-
ians.
I. CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE ON RELEVANT HISTORY
Although Justice Kennedy allocates more than half of the majority
opinion to the history of Hawaii,' he does not place that history in the
broader context of the history of federal Indian law. Much of the argu-
ment from both sides centers on whether Native Hawaiians can legally be
treated as Indians by way of the jurisprudence that identifies Indian status
as a political rather than a racial classification.9 It is thus necessary to un-
derstand the legal history of Indian policy. Numerous parallels exist
between the treatment of Native Hawaiians on the islands and the treat-
ment of Indians on the mainland. In several instances, however, the timing
of major developments in Hawaiian history worked to the detriment of
Native Hawaiians because of the character of Indian policy at the time.
Like most renditions of the history of Indian law, this section is organized
according to the different eras of federal Indian law and policy.10
6. Philip P Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal
Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1754, 1767 (1997) (commenting on the status of Native
Hawaiians in response to Benjamin, infra note 212).
7. For the purposes of this article, federal Indian law includes Supreme Court juris-
prudence regarding Indian tribes as well as congressional and executive policy towards
tribes, including Title 25 of the United States Code.
8. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 499-511.
9. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (N.M. Dist. Ct. 1974); infra notes
99-102, 130-33 and accompanying text.
10. Most scholars analyze federal Indian law based on the historical periods that cor-
respond with the prevailing policy towards Indians at that time: Pre-contact;Treaty Making
and Removal (1789-1871); Allotment and Assimilation (1871-1928); Indian Reorganiza-
tion (1928-1945) ;Ternination (1943-1961); and Self Determination (1961-present). E.g.,
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ch. 2 (1982). See also DAvID GErCHES
ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW chs. 2, 3, & 4 (4th ed. 1998); ROBERT N. CLINTON Er AL.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 137-65 (3d ed. 1991); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAw 10-32 (3d ed. 1998).
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A. Pre-Contact
Under the doctrine of discovery", aboriginal peoples were typically
viewed as heathen savages who, upon discovery, retained only limited "na-
tive tide" to the lands they occupied, subject to the will of the sovereign
that funded the discovery. Unlike the North American mainland, however,
the Hawaiian Islands were isolated from Western European contact for
centuries until 1778 when Captain James Cook arrived. 2 Each high
chief, or ali'i nui,1 3 controlled a district of an island or an entire island. 4
Local chiefs, the ali'i or konohiki,5 controlled specific lands, and common-
ers, or maka'ainana,16 worked them. Typically, lands were divided into
parcels defined by boundaries radiating from a point high on a mountain-
top down to the sea level, so as to enclose a drainage area. The parcel was
known as an ahupua'a,7 an economically self-sufficient tract of land that
usually included forest resources, farmland, fresh water, and access to the
sea.
Operation of the Hawaiian land tenure system somewhat resembled
the feudal arrangements that prevailed in medieval Europe, because a por-
tion of all that was produced went to the chiefs."' There were, however,
significant differences. 9 Hawaiians considered land to be held for the
common benefit. 20 If the maka'ainana believed that they were being
treated unfairly, they could simply move to another ahupua'a, as they were
not tied to the land.
21
B. Treaty Making and Removal (1789-1871)
As the newly-formed United States began its inexorable march
westward, it developed a nearly insatiable appetite for more land. Unfor-
tunately,22 the Indians already occupied the land. To satisfy western
11. See, e.g.,Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823). See also GETcHEs, supra note
10, at ch. 2; COHEN supra note 10, at ch. 2, § A.
12. GETCHES, supra note 10, at 944.
13. See MELODY KAPILIALOHA MACKENZIE, NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 305
(1991).
14. The ali'i nui often fought amongst themselves for control of various territories,
which resulted in periodic instability. See GETCHES, supra note 10, at 945.
15. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 798. See also MAcKENZIE, supra note 13, at 306.
16. See MACKENZIE, supra note 13, at 307.
17. GErCHES, supra note 10, at 945; See also COHEN, supra note 10, at 798. See also
MACKENZIE, supra note 13, at 305.
18. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 798; GETCHES, supra note 10, at 945.
19. See generally MACKENZIE, supra note 13, at 4.
20. GETCHES, supra note 10, at 945.
21. Id. at 945; See also COHEN,SUpra note 10, at 799; MACKENZIE, supra note 13, at 4.
22. That is, unfortunately for the Indians.
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expansion goals, the Indian lands usually were not taken by force, but
were instead ceded23 to the United States by treaty in return for, among
other things, the establishment of a trust relationship.24 The federal gov-
ernment thus assumed a guardian-ward relationship with the Indians, not
only because of prevailing racist notions of Indian societal inferiority2s but
also because the trust relationship was often consideration for the Indians'
23. Tribes in the East were more likely to be removed to Oklahoma, whereas tribes in
the West tended to have their land holdings reduced to smaller reservations. Compare Treaty
of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 1830, reprinted in 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS,
LAWS AND TREATIES 310 (1904) (signed by Choctaw leaders at bok chukfi ahithac- "the
little creek where the rabbits dance"-providing for the removal from the ancestral home-
lands in Mississippi and Alabama to land in southeastern Oklahoma), with Fort Laramie
Treaty, April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, reprinted in FRANCIS PRucA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY 109 (2000) (signed by the Sioux Nation at the conclusion of the
Powder RiverWar, establishing a reservation) [hereinafter "Fort Laramie Treaty"].
24. The scope of the trust relationship is multi-faceted. "Many treaties explicitly pro-
vided for protection by the United States." COHEN, supra note 10, at 65 n.38. See, e.g.,
Treaty with the Creeks,Aug. 7, 1790, art. 2, 7 Stat. 35, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 23, at
25 [hereinafter "Treaty with the Creeks"];Treaty with the Kaskaskia, Aug. 13, 1803, art. 2, 7
Stat. 78, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 23, at 67 [hereinafter "Treaty with the Kaskaskia"].
See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.They are communities de-
pendent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights .... From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Gov-
ernment with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there
arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive, and by Congress, and by this court, when-
ever the question has arisen.
Id. at 383-384.
Other treaties provided the means for subsistence. See, e.g., Fort Laramie Treaty, supra
note 23 (providing for subsistence rations for the Sioux.); 1828 Treaty with the Western
Cherokees, Art. 8, 7 Stat. at 313, reprinted in KAPPLER, supra note 23, at 290 [hereinafter
"Treaty with the Western Cherokees"]; COHEN, supra note 10, at 81 ("[E]ach Head of a
Cherokee family ... who may desire to remove West, shall be given, on enrolling himself
for emigration, a good Rifle, a Blanket, and a Kettle, and five pounds ofTobacco: (and to
each member of his family one Blanket,) ... a just compensation for the property he may
abandon.").
25. See, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 590 (1823) ("But the tribes of Indians in-
habiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose
subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.To leave them in possession of their country,
was to leave the country a wilderness. ); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17
(1831) ("[Indians] are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian.");Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 588 (1832) (discussing
the "humane policy of the government towards these children of the wilderness must
afford pleasure to every benevolent feeling"). These three cases, often referred to as the
"Marshall Trilogy," form much of the foundation for federal Indian law, particularly the
notion of the guardian-ward relationship and the concept of Indian tribes as "domestic
dependent nations?' Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
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relinquishment of land. 6 It is important to note that these treaties were
always entered into as government-to-government relationships between
the tribes as collective political entities and the United States. 27 "The
United States from the beginning of its political existence recognized a
measure of autonomy in the Indian bands and tribes. Treaties rested upon
a concept of Indian sovereignty ... and in turn greatly contributed to that
concept.' '28
In Hawaii, the situation was somewhat different. Perhaps "because of
their geographic isolation and close proximity to one another, Native
Hawaiians were able to unify to form a monarchy under King Kame-
hameha" 29 Political unification was instrumental in dealing with the
influx of foreigners who came to trade beginning in the nineteenth cen-
tury"3 In addition to preserving the "feudal" land tenure system,31 the
Hawaiian Kingdom furnished governmental leadership with which for-
eigners could deal and thereby encouraged foreign governments to enter
into diplomatic relationships with Hawaii.32
Before long, however, the Hawaiian government began to encounter
substantial foreign influence in its domestic affairs. Westerners gave advice
to the government, "often unsought and often in the shadow of a foreign
military presence."33 The land tenure system came under pressure as for-
eigners wanted land for themselves. 34 Originally, no formalized land titles
existed since the property interests of the King, the chiefs, and the com-
26. See, e.g.,Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 24;Treaty with the Kaskaskia, supra note
24;Treaty with the Western Cherokees, supra note 24; Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 23.
27. See, e.g.,Treaty with the Six Nations of October 22, 1784, reprinted in PRUCHA supra
note 23, at 4; Treaty of Fort McIntosh of January 21, 1785, reprinted in PRUCHA supra note
23, at 5; Fort Laramie Treaty of September 17, 1851, reprinted in PRUCHA supra note 23, at
84 (referring to the United States and the Sioux collectively as "the aforesaid nations").
28. FRANCIS PAUL PRUcHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL
ANOMALY 2 (1994).
29. COHEN, supra note 10, at 799.The availability of superior war-fighting technology
is often credited with the rapid unification of the Hawaiian Islands within a few decades of
Western contact. See, e.g.,JARED DIAMoND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL 64 (1997) ("After the
arrival of Europeans, the Big Island's King Kamehameha I rapidly proceeded with the
consolidation of the largest islands by purchasing European guns and ships to invade and
conquer [the other islands].").
30. GETcHES, supra note 10, p. 945.
31. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 501 ("When Kamehameha I came to power, he reasserted
suzerainty over all lands and provided for control of parts of them by a system described in
our cases as 'feudal" "); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); See also,
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 166-67 (1979).
32. S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law:
Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. Rsv. 309, 313-14 (1994). See also
infra notes 43-45.
33. GETCHES, supra note 10, at 945.
34. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 799.
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moners were intertwined." Pressure from Westerners who wanted to own
land in fee simple, however, resulted in a series of developments that for-
ever transformed Hawaiian land tenure relationships.
In 1840, on the advice ofWesterners, King Kamehameha III prom-
ulgated a written constitution. Significantly, the Constitution declared that
the monarchy controlled the land of the kingdom for the benefit of the
chiefs and the people who owned the land collectively.36 Pursuant to this
initial formal declaration clarifying land ownership in the kingdom, the
"Great Mahele" of 1848 affected a division of the lands so that clear title
could be determined and transferred. The mahele 7 required that the King
quitclaim his interest in about 1.5 million acres of ahupua'a and other
lands to 245 chiefs, designate another 1.5 million acres of government
lands for "the chiefs and people of my Kingdom,"3 and set aside one mil-
lion acres of crown lands "for me and for my heirs and successors forever,
as my own property exclusively."39 The mahele thus vested title in the King
and the chiefs and imposed descendancy requirements on the crown
lands, essentially creating an estate in fee tail. 40 Although the mahele did
not accomplish many of its intended objectives,' 1 it did lay the ground-
work for the establishment of a trust relationship between Native
Hawaiians and the United States in the future.
42
35. See id. at 798-99.
36. See id. at 799 n.14.
37. Literally "division." Id. at 799.
38. In re Estate ofKamehameha, 2 Haw. 715, 723 (1864).
39. Id. at 723.
40. See id. at 725-26 (ruling on the language of the Mahele and the accompanying
descendency requirements). See also COHEN, supra note 10, at 800 n.15.
41. The common people never received lands as originally anticipated by the land
commission that recommended the mahele. In fact, very little land ever reached individual
commoners. An intended remedy for the concentration of land outside commoners' hands
was the provision of an 1850 act that allowed tenants to apply for kuleana--small parcels
that they actually cultivated, and a houselot. Many of those eligible for kuleana did not get
them because they could not afford the survey costs or meet other requirements of the law.
Less than one percent of Hawaii's land was actually distributed as kuleana. Not only did
the mahele fail to distribute land widely among natives, it ultimately resulted in large
amounts of some of the best Hawaiian land passing to foreigners.The mahele and the laws
passed soon after it effectively lifted the restriction on alienation of property that had been
imposed by the 1840 Constitution. Government lands and the crown lands then were sold
whenever the King approved.The chief had incurred large debts that they paid with land.
Some attempted plantation farming but failed and lost their land through mortgage fore-
closure.The King was free to sell, lease, or mortgage his crown lands as he pleased and the
government sold considerable acreage, often at low prices.To check the loss of lands in this
way the Hawaiian legislature, following a court decision ruling that crown lands would
descend only to the successors of the King, declared in 1865 that crown lands were inal-
ienable. GETCHES, supra note 10, at 946.
42. The lands set aside as crown and government lands eventually became the basis
for a land trust for Native Hawaiians. See, e.g., Newlands Resolution, J. Res. 55, July 7,
1898, § 1, 30 Stat. 750;Admissions Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3,73 Stat. 4 (1959).
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Throughout the nineteenth century the Kingdom of Hawaii was ac-
knowledged to be a sovereign and independent state within the
international community. As such, it entered into numerous treaties with
various foreign governments,43 including the United States, which viewed
Hawaii as part of the American continental system.4 4 The Rice Court
noted that a number of treaties were signed between the United States
and the Kingdom of Hawaii during this period: "The first 'articles of ar-
rangement' between the United States and the Kingdom of Hawaii were
signed in 1826 ... and additional treaties and conventions between the
two countries were signed in 1849, 1875, and 1887." 41 It is important to
note that all of the treaties between the United States and the Kingdom
43. See generally Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International
Legal Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai'i's Annexation, and
Possible Reparations, 17 U. HAw. L. REv. 463,464 nn.7-16 (1995) (citing Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation between Belgium and Hawai'i, Oct 14,1862, Belg.-Haw.,
126 Consol.T.S. 329;Treaty between Denmark and Hawai'i, Oct. 19 1846, Den.-Haw., 100
Consol. T.S. 13; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Hawai'i and
Sweden, July 1, 1852, Haw.-Swed., 108 Consol.T.S. 217;Treary of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation between Hawai'i and Netherlands, Oct. 14, 1862. Neth.-Haw, 126 Con-
sol.TS. 343;Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Italy and Sandwich
Islands, July 22, 1863, Italy-Haw., 128 Consol. TS. 109; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation between Hawaiian Islands and Spain, Oct. 29, 1863, Haw.-Spain, 128 Con-
sol. T.S. 251; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment of Commerce between Hawai'i and
Switzerland, July 20, 1864, Haw.-Switz., 129 Consol.TS. 333; Convention of Commerce
and Navigation between Hawai'i and RussiaJune 19, 1869, Haw.-Russ., 139 Consol.T.S.
351; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Hawai'i and Japan, Aug. 19, 1870,
Haw.-Japan, 141 Consol. T.S. 447; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Austria-
Hungary and Hawai'i,June 18, 1875,Aus.-Hung.-Haw., 149 Consol.T.S. 305; Convention
between Hawai'i and Portugal for the Provisional Regulation of Relations of Friendship
and Commerce, May 5, 1882, Haw.-Port., 160 Consol.TS. 209).
44. See GErCHES, supra note 10, at 947. In 1842, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster
wrote "that the Government of the [Hawaiian] Islands ought to be respected; that no
power ought either to take possession of the islands as a conquest, or for the purpose of
colonization; and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing
[g]overnment." RALPH S. KUYKENDAIL, A HisTORy Or HAwAI'I 157 (1945). Later, U.S.
Secretary of State James Blaine would elucidate the U.S. position on the status of Hawaii
as a sovereign state within the American continental system:
This policy has been based upon our belief in the real and substantial in-
dependence of Hawai'i. The government of the United States has always
avowed and now repeats that, under no circumstances, will it permit the
transfer of the territory or sovereignty of these islands to any of the Euro-
pean powers.
ALICE FELTTYLER,THE FOREIGN PoLIcy OF JAMES G. BLAINE 198 (1927).
45. Rice, 528 U.S. at 504 (citations omitted). The court omitted mention of the treaty
between Hawaii and the United States that was signed in 1842. Perhaps the reason was
that in the 1842 treaty, President Tyler explicitly recognized the sovereignty of the King-
dom of Hawaii and declared it United States policy to support Hawaiian independence.
See RICH BUDNICK, STOLEN KINGDOM: AN AMERICAN CONSPIRACY 14 (1992). See also Pub.
L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
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of Hawaii treated Native Hawaiians as a collective political entity, not as
an ethnic group.
C. Allotment and Assimilation (1871-1928)
During this next period on the mainland Congress ceased making
treaties with the Indians46 and instead embarked on a concerted program
to destroy tribalism and assimilate Indians as individuals into the domi-
nant society. " This policy involved taking collectively-owned lands away
from tribes and allotting parcels to individual tribal members (and selling
the surplus at bargain prices to non-Indians)4 Although anti-Indian
prejudices undoubtedly contributed to the passage of the General Allot-
ment Act of 1887,' 9 historians agree that the Act was primarily "pushed
through Congress, not by western interests greedy for Indian lands, but by
eastern [liberals] who deeply believed that communal landholding was an
obstacle to the civilization they wanted the Indians to acquire ... "50
These liberals believed that "[p]ride of ownership ... would generate in-
dividual initiative ... and bring material and cultural advancement" for
the Indians."' Prominent liberal James Bradley Thayer of Harvard Law
School enthusiastically praised the Dawes Act--designed to sever the in-
dividual from the tribal collective-as a "great, far-reaching, and
beneficent" achievement.1
2
In an address to Congress in 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt
expressed his sense of the assimilation policy:
[T]he time has arrived when we should definitely make up
our minds to recognize the Indian as an individual and not
as a member of a tribe. The General Allotment Act is a
46. Treaty making with the Indians was ended by Congress in 1871:"[Hlereafter no
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent, nation, or power with whom the United States may con-
tract by treaty . Abolition of Treaty Making, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871), reprinted in
PRucHA, supra note 23, at 135. For timeline purposes it is worth noting that the end of
treaty-making with the Indians was within a few years of the last treaty signed with the
Kingdom of Hawaii.
47. See GETcHEs, supra note 10, at 141.
48. Id.
49. 24 Stat. 388 (1887). The statute is also known as the Dawes Act after Senator
Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. While the Dawes Act represented the final, flil-scale
realization of the allotment policy, many treaties made with western tribes from 1865 to
1868 provided for allotment in severalty of tribal lands. See ROBERT WINSTON MARDOCK,
ThE REFORMERS AND THEAMEUCAN INDIANS 212 (1971).
50. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER:ThE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 669 (1984).
51. MARDOCK, supra note 49, at 22.
52. James Bradley Thayer, The Dawes Bill and the Indians, ThE ATLANTIc MONTHLY,
Mar. 1888, at 315.
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mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass [acting]
directly upon the family and the individual .... "
The Allotment Era was thus marked by aggressive policies intended
to "pulvarize" the communal political identity of the native peoples on
the mainland. During this same period, however, the Kingdom of Hawaii
was itself overthrown and annexed. The United States did not subse-
quently identify Native Hawaiians as a separate political entity, for to do
so would have been inconsistent with the overall policy of destroying in-
digenous political sovereignty"
By the 1880s, American officials had come to view the Kingdom of
Hawaii as part of the American continental system, 5 meaning that the
"kingdom had come under the virtual suzerainty of the United States."
56
It was a colony in substance, if not in form, so that efforts by another for-
eign power, such as England or Japan, to colonize the islands would have
been regarded as acts in defiance of the United States' strategic interests in
the Pacific.57
American officials and Presidents as far back as Ulysses S. Grant had
suggested the idea of voluntary annexation of the kingdom by the United
States," but it was American merchants and missionary families that initi-
ated the chain of events by which Hawaii formally became a territory of
the United States. In 1887, having consolidated their economic gains into
political dominance, these primarily American Westerners forced the res-
ignation of the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Hawaii and the
subsequent adoption of a new "Bayonet Constitution' 9 The Constitution
53. 15 MESSAGES & PAPERS OF THE PRESIDETrS 6672 (1901) (emphasis added); see
PRucHA, supra note 50, at 669, 669 n.26 (noting that the "mighty pulverizing engine for
breaking up the tribal mass" language was originally used by Merrill E. Gates at the 1900
Lake Mohonk Conference).
54. At times, these tactics included attempts to destroy any vestige of cultural identity
whatsoever within the Native Hawaiian community. See e.g., LLIKALA KA ME'ELEIHIWA,
NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIREs: PEHEA LA E PONo As? 316 (1992) ("Once Hawai'i
became an American territory in 1900, foreigners prohibited Hawaiian language and beat
Hawaiian children for speaking it. As a result, we became ashamed to be Hawaiian."). See
also Jon M.Van Dyke, The Political Status of the Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y RE. 95,
103 n.50 (1998).
55. See supra note 44.
56. GErcHES, supra note 10, at 947.
57. See e.g., TYLER , supra note 44 (comments of Secretary of State Blaine).
58. GErcHEs, supra note 10, at 947.
59. So called because it was literally forced on the King at gunpoint (presumably with
a bayonet attached to the end). The coup was achieved with the help of two armed, vigi-
lante groups: the Honolulu Rifles and the Hawaiian League. See Taryn Ranae Tomasa,
Ho'Olahui:.The Rebirth of A Nation, 5 AsIAN L.J. 247 (1998).
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greatly increased the foreigner's political role,' for example, by extending
the right to vote to non-Hawaiians.
61
Still unsatisfied, the Westerners launched an insurrection in January
of 1893.62 John Stevens, the United States Minister to Hawaii, ordered the
United States Marines ashore in support of the insurrection and recog-
nized the new provisional government even before Queen Lili'uokalani's
lines of defense had surrendered. 63 Realizing the futility of fighting both
the armed merchants and the United States Marines, the Queen,
under this protest and impelled by said force, [yielded her]
authority until such time as the Government of the United
States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the
action of its representative and reinstate [her] and the au-
thority which [she] claim[ed] as the constitutional sovereign
of the Hawaiian Islands.
4
The insurrectionists' goal had been annexation by the United
States,65 but President Cleveland was unimpressed. Indeed, Clevland was
offended by the actions of the American Minister. He denounced the role
of the American forces, calling for the restoration of the Hawaiian monar-
chy.6 Attitudes changed with the next administration, however, and in
1898, President McKinley signed a Joint Resolution, sometimes called the
Joint Newlands Resolution, to annex the Hawaiian Islands as a territory
of the United States. 67 Under the terms of the Joint Resolution, the
60. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 800.
61. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 504.
Under the 1887 Constitution, the king was stripped of power and the
Hawaiian government was run by a United States-dominated cabinet.
King Kalakaua's displeasure with the bayonet constitution moved him to
propose restoration of his power. Attempts to reach that goal were all un-
successful. The presence of American military forces in Hawaii helped to
discourage these efforts, and American and European ministers directly
intervened to pressure the king to retreat from his position.
GErcHES, supra, note 10.
62. CoHEN, supra note 10,at 800.
63. Id.
64. Lili'uokalani v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 418, 435 (1910).
65. COHEN, supra note 10, at 801.
66. See President's Message Relating to the Hawaiian Islands, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 47
(2d Sess. 1893) ("But for the presence of the United States forces in the immediate vicin-
ity and in position to afford all needed protection and support the committee would not
have proclaimed the provisional government from the steps of the Government build-
ing.... [B]ut for the lawless occupation of Honolulu under false pretexts by the United
States forces ... the Queen and her Government would never have yielded...."). President
Cleveland also found "the provisional government lacked the popular support of the Na-
tive Hawaiian population." COHEN, supra note 10, at 801.
67. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 801.
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Republic of Hawaii" ceded all former "public, Government, or Crown
lands ' 69 to the United States. The resolution further provided that reve-
nues from the public lands were to be "used solely for the benefit of the
inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public pur-
poses."7' Two years later, "the Hawaiian Organic Act established the
Territory of Hawaii, asserted United States control over the ceded lands,
and put those lands 'in the possession, use, and control of the government
of the Territory of Hawaii ... until otherwise provided for by Con-
gress.' "71 By the provisions of the Act, an estimated 1.75 million acres of
former crown and government lands in which the Native Hawaiians
claimed an interest following the mahele, became United States property.
Just as it had with regard to the Pueblo, Navajo, and California Indians
after the war with Mexico and the subsequent treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo,72 the United States also inherited a trust responsibility with re-
gard to Native Hawaiians at the moment of annexation.
73
Although the stated policy of Congress was to destroy tribal cohe-
siveness, the existence of the trust responsibility prompted congressional
action when the deteriorating economic conditions of the Native Hawai-
ians could not be ignored. 74 Rather than restoring the land base to a
Native Hawaiian political entity, Congress enacted the Hawaiian Homes
68. The provisional government was later renamed The Republic of Hawaii. See
COHEN, supra note 10, at 801.
69. J. Res. 55,July 7, 1898, § 1, 30 Stat. 750.
70. Id.
71. Rice, 528 U.S. at 505 (quoting Act ofApr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 91,31 Stat. 159). It is
clear from the statutory language that Congress was plainly aware that it had assumed a
trust relationship with the Native Hawaiians.
72. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement between the United States
of America and the Mexican Republic, 9 Stat. 922 (1848). See also United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued legislative and ex-
ecutive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have
attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the
power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its
original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or
without the limits of a State.
Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
73. Just as the Pueblo, Navajo, and California Indians had been living under the for-
eign Mexican government, the Native Hawaiians had been living under the foreign (and
arguably illegal) Republic of Hawaii.
74. Secretary of the Interior Lane testified before Congress that "the natives of the
islands, who are our wards, I should say, and for whom in a sense we are trustees, are falling
off rapidly in numbers, and many of them are in poverty." H.R. REP. No. 839, at 4 (2d
Sess. 1920).
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Commission Act (HHCA).5 The Act created a system somewhat similar
to allotment; whereby 200,000 acres of the land ceded to the United
States at annexation were set aside for the purpose of leasing homesteads
for a nominal fee to individual Native Hawaiians. According to Professor
Williams, "The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act was remarkably similar
in purpose and effect to the General Allotment Act. Both statutes sub-
merged Congress's good intentions in the ambitions of others who
coveted the lands. Both were poorly carried out, often giving their pur-
ported beneficiaries parcels of inarable land "'6 Significantly, the HHCA
defined Native Hawaiians racially" rather than politically, because a
collective political identification would have been inconsistent with the
anti-tribal policies of the time. The "pulverizing engine" was, in effect, still
running."
D. The Period of Indian Reorganization (1928-1945)
By 1928 it was clear that the United States needed to change its
policies towards tribal government structures. In response to the Merriam
Report,79 Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA),
also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act. ° The IRA completely repudi-
ated the policy of allotment. The legislation allowed tribes to adopt
constitutions and to reestablish structures for governance. Congress also
75. See Act ofJuly 9, 1921, ch. 42, 42 Stat. 108 (1921).
76. GETCHES, supra note 10, at 949.
77. The Act defined Native Hawaiians to be "any descendant of not less than one-half
part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778" 42 Stat.
108 (1921).The sad irony of this restriction is that the blood quantum requirement was
not an attempt by the Native Hawaiians to exclude others, but was rather incorporated at
the urging of the sugar barons and ranching interests to ensure that only a limited number
of Native Hawaiians could participate, thus leaving a larger surplus of land for ranching
and sugar plantations. See Lesley Karen Friedman, Native Hawaiians, Self-Determination, and
the Inadequacy of the State Land Tusts, 14 HAwAii L. Rav. 519 (1992). In fact, an earlier ver-
sion of the HHCA imposed only a 1/32 blood quantum requirement. See MAcKENZIE,
supra note 13, at 47. See also Rice, 528 U.S. at 532 n.8
[the] compromise between the sponsor of the legislation, who supported
special benefits for 'all who have Hawaiian blood in their veins and plan-
tation owners who thought that only 'Hawaiians of the pure blood'
should qualify. [Eventually] the statute defined a 'native Hawaiian' as 'any
descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhab-
iting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778?
Id. (citations omitted).
78. See supra note 53.
79. The Merriam Report, documenting the failure of federal Indian policy during the
allotment period, was issued in 1928. The report's official title was INsTrruTE FOR GOVT.
RESEARCH, STUDIEs IN ADMINISTRATIONJIE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.
80. 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1994).
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passed specific acts"t to remedy the effects of certain policies that had been
in place during the allotment era. The policies of the Allotment Era were
established with the intention of destroying the governance structure of
particular tribes, such as the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma. 2 No one
could deny that congressional policy had completely reversed itself-
tribal sovereignty was now to be encouraged rather than destroyed. Many
tribes began to thrive economically as a result. The IRA "provided a pow-
erful stimulus to tribal governmental organization and in many cases so
strengthened that organization as to enable continued development de-
spite fluctuations in administrative policy.""
Unfortunately for the Native Hawaiians, congressional focus on their
plight and the subsequent passage of the HHCA predated the IRA by
more than a decade. The HHCA was an allotment-era policy l 4 -enacted
when Congress still thought that the "civilization" of these indigenous
savages required the destruction of their sense of autonomy and their
identification as a separate political identity. Had the plight of Native Ha-
waiians been considered during the IRA era, congressional policy would
have been to strengthen communal identity and native sovereignty. The
resulting legislation might have recognized a Native Hawaiian political
entity and fostered various exercises of Native Hawaiian sovereignty. In
81. The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 (OIWA), 49 Stat. 1967 (codified as 25
U.S.C. § 503),"permitted Oklahoma Indians to take advantage of most of the provisions of
the 1934 Wheeler-Howard Act, which ended allotments in severalty, allowed the
re-establishment of communal lands, and permitted the organization of tribal governments
with control over tribal funds." Morris v.Watt, 640 E2d 404 (1981) (decided as Morris v.
Andrus, reflecting a change in the Secretary of the Interior).
82. The Curtis Act,Act ofJune 28,1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495, and the FiveTribesAct,
Act of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, were both designed to destroy tribal cohe-
siveness among the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee, and Seminole Nations. The
Five Tribes Act was particularly brutal in its dismantling of any sense of political auton-
omy:
That the tribal existence and present tribal governments of the Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek and Seminole tribes or nations are hereby
continued in ful force and effect for all purposes authorized by law, until
otherwise provided by law, but the tribal council or legislature in any of
said tribes or nations shall not be in session for a longer period than thirty
days in any one year: Provided, That no act, ordinance, or resolution (ex-
cept resolutions for adjournment) of the tribal council or legislature of
any of the said tribes or nations shall be of any validity until approved by
the President of the United States: Provided further, That no contract in-
volving the payment or expenditure of any money or affecting any
property belonging to any of said tribes or nations made by them or any
of them or by any officer thereof, shall be of any validity until approved
by the President of the United States.
34 Stat. 137.
83. GETCHES, supra note 10, at 197.
84. See supra note 76.
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this respect, the Native Hawaiians were victims of history. Deleterious
anachronisms of congressional policy toward Native Hawaiians were not
limited to the timing of the passage of the HHCA, however. Other his-
torical anomalies would damage the cause of Native Hawaiian sovereignty
during the next shift in congressional Indian policy.
E. The Termination Period (1945-1961)
After World War II, congressional policy towards the Indians reversed
itself once again. A 1949 Report on Indian Affairs by the Hoover Com-
mission recommended "an about-face in federal policy: 'complete
integration' of the Indians should be the goal so that Indians [will] move
'into the mass of the population as full ... citizens."s The official con-
gressional policy in 1953 was "to end [the Indians'] status as wards of the
United States."8 6 For the tribes that were "terminated" under this policy,
the results were disastrous.87
The tragic saga of the Native Hawaiians moved into its next phase
during this termination period. In 1959, as part of the Hawaiian State-
hood Act,"8 Congress delegated to the State of Hawaii the trust
responsibility owed to the Native Hawaiians. Congress ceded 1.2 million
acres of land to the State for five specified purposes, including: "The bet-
terment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act'" 9 In authorizing the grant, the Act "recited that
these lands, and the proceeds and income they generated, were to be held
as a public trust ..... In addition, the new State of Hawaii "agreed to
adopt the [HHCA] as part of its own Constitution."' Unfortunately the
Act's constitutionally-defective racial categorizations carried over because
identifying Native Hawaiians as a political entity would have been incon-
sistent with the termination policies of the time. Once again, historical
anachronisms dealt Native Hawaiian sovereignty a crushing blow.
E The Era of Self Determination (1961-present)
Just as Congress had reversed itself when it repudiated allotment and
passed the IRA, the policy of termination was also short-lived. Ironically,
as Professor Williams notes, termination had the opposite effect in its
85. GErcHES, supra note 10, at 204.
86. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong. (1953).
87. See CANBY, supra note 10, at 26.
88. See Admissions Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
89. Id. at 6.
90. Rice, 528 U.S. at 507-08 (internal quotations omitted).
91. Id. at 507.
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attempt to detribalize.9 2 Indians finally recognized that federal policy too
often was directed at destroying tribalism. From that perspective, they
concluded "that only tribal control of Indian policy and lasting guarantees
of sovereignty could assure tribal survival in the United States ... -93 With
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' abandonment of the
termination policy, "programs such as the Economic Opportunity Act
[were passed, which] recognized the permanency of Indian tribes and the
importance of social investment in reservation communities." '
President Nixon was arguably the most ardent supporter of Indian
sovereignty and he issued a landmark statement calling for a new federal
policy of "self-determination" for Indian nations.9" Perhaps the greatest of
Nixon's contributions to Indian tribal sovereignty was Public Law 638,
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,96
which expressly authorized the Secretaries of Interior and Health and
Human Services to contract with and make grants to Indian tribes and
other Indian organizations for the delivery of federal services. Acting at
times pursuant to federal court orders,97 the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA)98 even assisted tribes in reconstituting their tribal governance struc-
tures.
During this period the Supreme Court handed down Morton v. Man-
carl,99 one of the most important Indian cases of the modern era. The
opinion held that tribal Indians were "members of quasi-sovereign tribal
entities'" ° and that Indian status was thus "political rather than racial in
nature."'0' Mancari involved the BIA's hiring preference for Indians, but
the Court has extended its holding to other areas of Indian policy as
"long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
92. See GErcHES, supra note 10, at 224.
93. Id.
94. GErcHES,supra note 10, at 226.
95. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations
for Indian Policy, H.R.Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 1970). See also The
Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974) (codified as 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1451-1453).
96. Pub. L. No. 93-638 (1994) (codified in 25 U.S.C. §5 450a-450).
97. See e.g., Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 E Supp. 1110, 1121 (D.D.C.1976), aff'd sub nora. Harjo
v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir.1978); Morris v.Watt, 640 F2d 404 (1981). In both in-
stances, the court order reinstated tribal constitutions from the 19th century. The BIA
subsequently assisted the tribes in redrafting modern constitutions. See generally Gavin
Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty:A TribalJudiciary Analysis, 50 U. KAN. L. Ray.
473 (2002), (HBS Working Paper No. 01-151).
98. The BIA is part of the Department of the Interior and is the primary agency
responsible for managing Indian affairs, although other agencies such as the Department of
Justice and Health and Human Services also have specialized departments for interaction
with Indian tribes.
99. 417 U.S. 535 (1978).
100. Id. at 554.
101. Id. at 553 n.24.
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Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians" and the policy "is rea-
sonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government"' 10 2
Congress was not silent with regards to Native Hawaiians during this
period either."3 In 1993, Congress passed a joint resolution acknowledg-
ing the one-hundredth anniversary of the January 17, 1893, overthrow of
the Kingdom of Hawaii, with the participation of citizens and agents of
the United States. Congress offered "an apology to Native Hawaiians on
behalf of the United States" and called on the executive branch "to sup-
port reconciliation efforts between the United States and the Native
Hawaiian people." '4
The State of Hawaii also began to reexamine the situation of Native
Hawaiians and in 1978 amended its Constitution to establish the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, 05 designating as its mission "the betterment of condi-
tions of native Hawaiians ... [and] Hawaiians."' 16 A Native Hawaiian board
of trustees manages OHA, receiving and expending the portion of in-
come from trust lands that is allocable to Native Hawaiians.1 7 The well-
intentioned members of the Hawaiian legislature and the constitutional
convention that established OHA did not make any concerted attempts to
enter into a government-to-government relationship with a Native Ha-
waiian political entity or to recognize any element of Native Hawaiian
sovereignty, perhaps because they were satisfied with the racial definitions
102. Id. at 554. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court of Rosebud County, 424 U.S. 382,390
(1976) (per curium); United States v.Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,645 (1977). See also, e.g., Moe
v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
103. Numerous statutes mention Native Hawaiians. See, e.g,, the National Historic
Preservation Act, § 4006(a)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 470a(d)(6) (West Supp. 1998); the National
Museum of the American Indian Act, § 1-10, 13, 16, 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q-80q-12, 80q-15
(1994); the Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act, § 4106(d), 21
U.S.C. § 1177(d) (1994) (defining the category of Native Americans as expressly including
"Native Hawaiians"); Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2912 (1994)
(explicitly including Native Hawaiian languages); the Workforce Investment Act of 1998,
§ 29 U.S.C.A. § 2911 (West Supp. 1998); the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1996 (1994) (stating that the Native Hawaiian faiths are explicitly included in the
subset of religions described in the statutory heading as "Native American"); the Native
American Programs Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2991-2992 (1994); the Comprehensive
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act, § 311 (c)(4),
42 U.S.C. § 4577(c)(4); the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994) (extending protection to American Indian and Native Ha-
waiian burial sites). See also Van Dyke, supra note 54, at 106 n.67.
104. Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993). Note that Section 2 of the Apology
Resolution defines Native Hawaiians politically in terms of their sovereignty: "As used in
this Joint Resolution, the term 'Native Hawaiian' means any individual who is a descen-
dent of the aboriginal people who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in
the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii." Id.
105. See HAw. CONST. art. XII, § 5 (1978).
106. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 10-3 (1993).
107. See HAW. CosT. art. XII, § 6 (1978).
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of "Native Hawaiian" or "Hawaiian."'"' Yet, these particular racially-based
classifications would be the linchpin in the case against the racially-
exclusive system of election of the OHA board of trustees.
II.ThE CASE OF RICE v CAYETANO
Although OHA and related programs had "been in place for decades
and [had often] proven themselves to be more divisive than beneficial'
10 9
within the Native Hawaiian community, it was litigation from outside the
community that proved to be its greatest threat.
A. Procedural History
The petitioner, Harold "Freddy" Rice, was a "citizen of Hawaii and a
descendant of pre-annexation residents of the islands."" He was not,
however, a "descendant of pre-1778 native inhabitants, and so [was] nei-
ther 'native Hawaiian' nor 'Hawaiian' as defined""' by statute.' 2 Rice
applied to vote in the election for OHA trustees in March 1996, but in
order "to register to vote for the office of trustee," Rice was "required to
attest: I am also Hawaiian and desire to register to vote in OHA elec-
tions."" 3 Because "Rice marked through the words 'am also Hawaiian' and
then checked the form 'yes"" the State denied his application to vote."'
Mr. Rice sued Benjamin Cayetano, the Governor of Hawaii, in the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, on the grounds
108. The term "Hawaiian" is defined by statute:" 'Hawaiian' means any descendant of
the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and
subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to
reside in Hawaii." HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (2000).The statute defines "native Hawaiian" as
follows:
"Native Hawaiian" means any descendant of not less than one-half part of
the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778, as defined by
the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended; provided that
the term identically refers to the descendants of such blood quantum of
such aboriginal peoples which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the
Hawaiian Islands in 1778 and which peoples thereafter continued to re-
side in Hawaii.
Id.
109. Eric Steven O'Malley, Irreconcilable Rights and the Question of Hawaiian Statehood, 89
GEo. L.J. 501,536 (2001).
110. Rice, 528 US. at 510.
111. Id.
112. HAW. R.E. STAT. § 10-2 (2000).
113. Rice, 528 U.S. at 510.
114. Id.
[VOL. 7:317
Not Because They are Brown
that the voting restriction violated the Fifteenth Amendment, ' 'I as well as
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. '16
Rice's primary argument was that the Fifteenth Amendment's com-
mand is clear and allows for no exceptions or excuses." ' According to the
Amendment, "the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race." 8 Rice contended that "[d]espite the plain terms of the Fifteenth
Amendment and more than a century of this Court's jurisprudence, the
State of Hawaii has imposed a stark race-based restriction on the right to
vote in statewide elections for officials who distribute public funds." '9
Rice further argued that "[t]his flagrant racial discrimination in the voting
booth plainly violates the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee of race-
neutral voting laws and is patently offensive."'2 ° Rice argued that nothing
could salvage the OHA voting structure. Neither the beneficial motives of
the state, the "special limited purpose" of the elections, nor the attempt to
label the voting restriction as a political-as opposed to a racial-
classification was sufficient to cure the alleged constitutional defect.'21
Rice's second argument was that the voting scheme violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.'22 Rice maintained
that the race-based voting restriction could not withstand strict scrutiny,
and that no lesser form of scrutiny was appropriate.'23 In essence, Rice's
position was that Native Hawaiians were not in the same position as In-
dian tribes on the mainland and therefore should not be treated as
"Indians." If the Native Hawaiians were not "Indians," then the lesser
scrutiny allowed by Mancari2 could not be used in examining policies for
Native Hawaiians.
The State argued that rational-basis judicial review was proper re-
garding the Hawaiian-only voting requirement, because Native Hawaiians
were just as "native" as any other Native Americans. ' In the State's view,
because the history of interaction between Native Hawaiians and the
United States was similar to the history of other Native Americans, and
115. See Brief for Petitioner at 13, Rice v. Cayetano 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818).
116. See id. at 28.
117. Id. at 13.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XV
119. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 115, at 13.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 14-27.
122. See id. at 28.
123. See id. at 28-45. The Court generally applies rational basis scrutiny when review-
ing congressional statutes affecting Native Americans. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(N.M. Dist. Ct. 1974).
124. See Mancari, 417 U.S. 535; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 115, at 28-49.
125. See Brief for Respondent at 15, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-
818).
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because Congress had repeatedly "extended to Native Hawaiians the same
rights and privileges accorded to American Indian, Alaska[n] Native, Es-
kimo, and Aleut communities," 12 6 rational-basis review was justified. Citing
case law governing the Pueblos in New Mexico' 27 and Alaskan Natives,
2
1
the State argued that Congress had "historically exercised its Indian-affairs
power over indigenous people not organized into tribes in an anthropo-
logical sense, not recognized as tribes under then-prevailing definitions, or
whose tribal status had been terminated ... ,129 Further, the State noted,
the Supreme Court had upheld the use of this power.
The State's objective in arguing that Native Hawaiians should be
treated legally as Indians was to convince the district court to apply
Mancari,13 ° and find that the OHA voting restriction worked to fulfill the
unique Congressional obligation toward Indians and to advance Indian
self-governance. The State pointed out the Supreme Court's recognition
in Mancari that Congress has passed innumerable laws with respect to
Native Americans. "If these laws, derived from historical relationships and
explicitly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial
discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.)
would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment of the Govern-
ment toward the Indians would be jeopardized " ' 31 The State also pointed
out that the Court has embraced the Mancari rationale for reviewing "leg-
islation that singles out Indians for particular and special treatment" '32 and
has found "the argument that [Indian] classifications are 'suspect' to be
'untenable' "133
The district court was persuaded by the State's arguments, particu-
larly those comparing Native Hawaiians to the Indian tribes of the
continental United States."' The court found that the history of the is-
lands and their people revealed the existence of a guardian-ward
relationship with Native Hawaiians and compared that relationship to the
one between the United States and the Indian tribes in granting summary
126. Id. at 31 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7902(13)).
127. See United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1876). See also United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
128. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). See also Alaska v. NativeVillage ofVene-
tie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
129. Brief for Respondent, supra note 125, at 31-32.
130. 417 U.S. 535.
131. Brief for Respondent, supra note 125, at 25 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552).
132. Id. (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554-55 and citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,
692 (1990); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979) (quoting Mancan); and Washington v. Confederated Bands &
Tribes ofYakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463,500-01 (1979) (same)).
133. Brief for Respondent, supra note 125, at 26 (citing Confederated Bands, 439 U.S. at
501).
134. See Rice v. Cayetano, 963 E Supp. 1547 (D. Hawai'i 1997).
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judgment. 13 The court granted the qualification for voting the same lati-
tude as legislation relating to Congress' power over Indian affairs.' 36 The
court held that the voting requirement was "rationally related to the
State's responsibility under the Admission Act to utilize a portion of the
proceeds from the [trust] lands for the betterment of Native Hawaiians."
Accordingly, the district court declared that the voting restriction was
constitutional and did not violate the ban on racial classifications.'
3
1
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, pointing out
that Rice had not challenged the constitutionality of OHA and its pro-
grams. 3 Seeking to preserve "the trusts and their administrative structure
as [it found] them, and assum[ing] that both are lawful" the court held
that the State of Hawaii "may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being
the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees
owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees
ought to be."'39 The fact that the Hawaiian Constitution and implement-
ing statutes "contain a racial classification on their face""' ° was not
sufficiently persuasive to justify invalidating the voting restrictions. 4'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,' and numerous amicus cu-
riae briefs were filed on both sides. The Office of the Solicitor General,
on behalf of the United States, filed one of the strongest briefs supporting
the OHA race-based voting restriction. This brief advanced two points:
(1) "Congress has concluded that it has a trust responsibility to Native
Hawaiians precisely because it bears responsibility for the destruction of
their government and their loss of'sovereignty over their land;' 4 3 and (2)
"Congress does not extend services to Native Hawaiians because of their
race, but because of their unique status as the indigenous people of a
once-sovereign nation as to whom the United States has established a
trust relationship."'
4 4
135. See id. at 1551-54.
136. See id. at 1554-55 (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555).
137. Id. at 1555.
138. See Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1998).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1081.
142. See Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 526 U.S. 1016
(1999).
143. Amicus Brief of the Solicitor General at 9, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)
(No. 98-818).
144. Id. at 10.
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B. The Decisions
Voting seven to two, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding
that the OHA voting restriction violated the Fifteenth Amendment.14
The Court issued four separate opinions. Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas. Justice Breyer authored a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Souter. Justices Stevens and Ginsberg each wrote dissenting opinions, with
Justice Ginsberg joining part ofJustice Stevens' dissent.
1.The Majority Opinion
Part I of the majority opinion presented a brief review of the history
of the Hawaiian Islands. Part II discussed the historical development of
the remedial federal and state structures put in place for the benefit of
Native Hawaiians. Although Justice Kennedy's historical review consumed
more than six pages, the opinion did not address the sovereignty exercised
by Native Hawaiians prior to the illegal coup in 1893, nor did it examine
the relevant history within the broader context of federal Indian law.146
The basis for the majority opinion was presented in Part III.There, Justice
Kennedy summarized the Court's understanding of the Fifteenth
Amendment:
The purpose and command of the Fifteenth Amendment
are set forth in language both explicit and comprehensive.
The National Government and the States may not violate a
fundamental principle: They may not deny or abridge the
right to vote on account of race. 47
The Court then rejected the argument that the OHA voting restric-
tions were not racial but rather ancestral in nature, declaring that
"[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here."" ' 8
Part IV of the majority opinion discussed the various arguments
made by the State in support of the OHA voting restrictions. The Court
first rejected the argument that the voting restriction was valid under
prior Supreme Court decisions "allowing the differential treatment of
certain members of Indian tribes.'" 1 49 The Court determined that if this
argument were valid, it would require the treatment of Native Hawaiians
as "tribes."The Court, however, did not resolve that issue: "[Elven were we
to take the substantial step of finding authority in Congress, delegated to
145. See supra Part II.
146. Rice, 528 U.S. at 524.
147. Id. at 511-12.
148. Id. at 514.
149. Id. at 518
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the State, to treat Hawaiians or native Hawaiians as tribes, Congress may
not authorize a State to create a voting scheme of this sort"
15 0
For the majority, the fatal flaw in OHA's remedial infrastructure was
the fact that OHA was a state agency:
Although it is apparent that OHA has a unique position un-
der state law, it is just as apparent that it remains an arm of
the State .... [T]he elections for OHA trustee are elections
of the State, not of a separate quasi-sovereign, and they are
elections to which the Fifteenth Amendment applies. To ex-
tend Mancari to this context would be to permit a State, by
racial classification, to fence out whole classes of its citizens
from decision making in critical state affairs. The Fifteenth
Amendment forbids this result."'
Thus, although Congress has the authority to pass laws regarding In-
dian tribes, and although that authority includes acknowledging tribes as
quasi-sovereign entities, the Court found that Congress does not have the
authority to allow states to violate constitutional provisions.'52 The OHA
elections were not held by a tribe but rather by the State. Although tribal
elections are exempt from the Fifteenth Amendment,- 3 states are not. Ul-
timately, then, any quasi-sovereign status that the Native Hawaiians might
enjoy was irrelevant to the case at hand.
The Court also did not agree that the OHA elections were "special,
limited purpose" elections and thus exempt from constitutional restric-
tions on voting procedures.' The Court gave two reasons for rejecting
the argument that the State was simply ensuring "an alignment of interests
between the fiduciaries and the beneficiaries of a trust:"' First, the Court
determined that although both Native Hawaiians and Hawaiians had
150. Id. at 519.
151. Id. at 521-22.
152. See id.
153. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the freedom of tribes from consti-
tutional restraints against governmental action. See generally CAmBY, supra note 10. While
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994), imposes many of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights on tribes, ICRA does not include the restrictions
found in the Fifteenth Amendment.
154. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 522. Previously the Supreme Court had declared that certain
elections for special governmental entities, such as those for water or irrigation districts,
were not subject to the "one person, one vote" rule if they were restricted only to those
who might be affected by the regulations of the board. Ball v.James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981);
Salyer Land Co. v.Tulare Lake BasinWater Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).The State of
Hawaii argued that this same theory applied to OHA elections because the votes would
create a special state agency serving a special class.The Court took the position that the
special purpose cases arose under the Fourteenth, not the Fifteenth Amendment. It did not
consider discrimination on the basis of race in those cases.
155. Rice, 528 U.S. at 523.
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equal votes in electing trustees, the two groups were not treated equally in
the budget of OHA, thus creating rather than eliminating "a differential
alignment between the identity of OHA trustees and what the State calls
beneficiaries." '6 Second, the majority found that:
[t]he State's position rests, in the end, on the demeaning
premise that citizens of a particular race are somehow more
qualified than others to vote on certain matters. That
reasoning attacks the central meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment.... All citizens, regardless of race, have an
interest in selecting officials who make policies on their
behalf, even if those policies will affect some groups more
than others.
1 5 7
The Court determined that, the State of Hawaii had created a voting
restriction based on race and that it could not overcome the Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition of such a restriction.
2.The Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion, which Justice Souter
joined. The concurring Justices went much farther than the majority in
attacking the rationale of the OHA voting structure. According to Justice
Breyer, "Hawaii's effort to justify its rules through analogy to a trust for an
Indian tribe [must be rejected] because the record makes clear that (1)
there is no 'trust' for native Hawaiians here, and (2) OHA's electorate, as
defined in the statute, does not sufficiently resemble an Indian tribe." 's
For Justice Breyer, these two objections were sufficient "to destroy the
analogy on which Hawaii's justification must depend." '9
3.The Dissent
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, which Ginsburg joined in
part, that began:
The Court's holding today rests largely on the repetition of
glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 525 (BreyerJ., concurring). In particular, the concurring justices had signifi-
cant, although misplaced, reservations about highly fractionated blood quantum
participants in a tribal society. See id. at 526-27. For the analysis of the logical errors in the
concurring opinion on this issue, see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (discussing
the tribal membership of persons with small factions of Native-American blood).
159. Rice, 528 U.S. at 527 (BreyerJ., concurring).
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the compelling history of the State of Hawaii. When that
history is held up against the manifest purpose of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and against two centuries
of this Court's federal Indian law, it is clear to me that
Hawaii's election scheme should be upheld.
160
Having correctly pointed out that the majority opinion lacked any
sense of connectedness to the history of Hawaii and the trust responsibili-
ties owed to Native Hawaiians,Justice Stevens proceeded to refute each of
the majority's contentions, alluding often to concepts of indigenous sover-
eignty.161  His ultimate conclusion that the racially-defined voting
restriction was not constitutionally defective, however, was not grounded
in the inherent residual sovereignty of Native Hawaiians. Instead, Justice
Stevens based his holding on the appropriateness of classifying Native




In presenting a rather formalistic analysis that led to a narrow
holding on Fifteenth Amendment grounds, the majority suggested an
alternative remedial infrastructure that would have avoided the
constitutional defect that resulted in reversal.1 61 In addressing the State's
argument that Mancari allowed the State to treat Native Hawaiians
differently, Justice Kennedy identified that defect as the State's
establishment of a race-based voting scheme. The majority avoided
directly deciding whether Congress had determined that Native
Hawaiians could be treated like Indians from a policy standpoint, 163 but it
did not deny that Congress could make that determination.The majority
stated unequivocally that Mancari did not allow Congress to "authorize a
State to establish a voting scheme that limits the electorate for its public
officials to a class of tribal Indians, to the exclusion of all non-Indian
citizens.'1 61 But the Court's Indian law jurisprudence is equally clear
160. Id. at 527-28 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 529,532-33,536-541,542 n.14 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 521-22.The majority also dismissed the two additional arguments, that the
restrictions were analogous to special purpose districts and that the restrictions were in-
tended to insure alignment of interests between the fiduciaries and beneficiaries of the
trust, (see supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text) but did not provide any further
insight on what sort of structure would be acceptable when it addressed those arguments.
163. See id. at 519.
164. Id. at 520.
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under Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez16 that tribes have broad authority to
define their membership, including establishing ancestral requirements,
and thus can control who can vote in an election based on ancestry.166
Significantly, the majority indicated that if the entity in question, such as a
Native Hawaiian polity, were "a separate quasi-sovereign," either Mancari
or Santa Clara167 or both would apply. The constitutional defect would
thus be eliminated, as the Fifteenth Amendment does not apply to tribal
elections. 168
2.The Concurring Opinion
Although finding that "OHA bears little resemblance to a trust for
native Hawaiians, ' '161 the concurring Justices suggested that a trust respon-
sibility is still owed to Native Hawaiians7 ' since "Native Hawaiians,
considered as a group, may be analogous to tribes of other Native Ameri-
cans."'17 The problem, as Justice Breyer saw it, was that "the statute defines
the electorate in a way that is not analogous to membership in an Indian
tribe""'
Justice Breyer reaffirmed that "a Native American tribe has broad au-
thority to define its membership"' 7 3 but suggested that definitions of
tribal membership should be limited to what is reasonable. 74 In his opin-
ion, however, Justice Breyer was somewhat vague and inconsistent as to
what reasonable tribal membership definitions might entail. In Santa
Clara, cited by Justice Breyer, the children of a Navajo father and a Pueblo
mother were denied Pueblo tribal membership because Pueblos are patri-
lineal. 175 It would seem that Justice Breyer was comfortable that such a
165. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
166. Id. at 55.
167. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 519-22; see also infra note 175 and accompanying text.
168. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 520; supra note 153.
169. Rice, 528 U.S. at 525 (BreyerJ., concurring).
170. Although Justice Breyer contended that OHA was not a trust for Native Hawai-
ians, a trust responsibility owed to Native Hawaiians still existed even if OHA was not a
proper embodiment of that trust responsibility. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying
text.
171. Id. at 526.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 527 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,72 n.32 (1978)).
174. See id. Note that it is unclear from the text of his opinion whether Justice Breyer
would impose his reasonableness limitations on all tribal membership definitions, or just
those defined in state or federal statutes: "There must, however, be some limit on what is
reasonable, at the least when a State (Which is not itself a tribe) creates the definition." Id.
175. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 52. The children would also have been ineligible to be
members of the Navajo Nation, since Navajos are matrilineal and matrilocal. In Navajo
society, children "are 'born of' their mother's clan... " James W Zion & Robert Yazzie,
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membership determination was "reasonable" as well he should. The Court
stated in Santa Clara that:
A tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal pur-
poses has long been recognized as central to its existence as
an independent political community. Given the often vast
gulf between tribal traditions and those with which federal
courts are more intimately familiar, the judiciary should not
rush to create causes of action that would intrude on these
delicate matters.
176
Justice Breyer seemed to have difficulty, however, with fractionated
ancestral qualifications for tribal membership. As examples of reasonable
tribal definitions, Justice Breyer first pointed to the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, citing the portion of the statute which conferred "Native"
status to anyone
who is regarded as an Alaska Native by the Native village or
Native group of which he claims to be a member and
whose father or mother is ... regarded as Native by any vil-
lage or group (a classification perhaps more likely to reflect
real group membership than any blood quantum require-
ment).177
Justice Breyer also cited the Constitution of the Choctaw Nation of
Oklahoma, T17 which provides: "[T]he Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma shall
consist of all Choctaw Indians by blood whose name appears on the
original rolls of the Choctaw Nation approved pursuant to Section 2 of
the Act of April 26, 1906 (34 Stat. 136) and their lineal descendants.
'179
Justice Breyer seemed to have great difficulty with someone with 1/512th
of Hawaiian blood being eligible to vote in the OHA elections,"s yet his
approval of the Choctaw membership policies neglected to mention that
if original enrollees'81 at the beginning of the twentieth century had
1/32nd Choctaw blood, as many did, 8 2 their modern day descendants
Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rv. 55,
77 (1997).
176. Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32 (citation omitted).
177. Rice, 528 U.S. at 526 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b) (1994)).
178. Id.
179. CHOCTAW CONST. of 1983, art. II,§ 1.
180. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 527.
181. "Original enrollees" were tribal members whose names appear on the Dawes
Rolls from the allotment era. See supra note 49.
182. On my paternal great-grandfather's roll page, there are thirteen tribal members
listed with 1/32nd Choctaw blood. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION TO THE FivE CIVi-
LIZED TRIBES, THE FINAL ROLLS OF CITIZENS AND FREEDMEN OF THE FiE CIVILIZED TRIBES
IN INDIAN TERRITORY 6 (1907).
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would still be eligible for tribal membership even though their blood
quantum could also be 1/512th5 3 (applying the same assumptions Justice
Breyer used with respect to Native Hawaiians) 4
In essence, the concurring Justices arrived at the appropriate conclu-
sion for the wrong reasons. The fixation on race is ill-founded when
dealing with the political status of Indian tribal membership.The color of
one's skin is not the determining factor for tribal membership; it is one's
ancestry. For Indian tribes, ancestry need not be a proxy for race.
One way to distinguish Indians (and Native Hawaiians) collectively
as a political, rather than a racial, entity is to focus on membership as a
property right analogous to an estate in fee tail."' In matrilineal societies,
such as the Navajo, membership is analogous to an estate in fee tail fe-
male;"86 whereas in patrilineal societies, such as the Pueblo, membership is
analogous to an estate in fee tail male." 7 Rather than being considered
racial in nature, blood quantum requirements for membership, such as
with the Eastern Band of Cherokeess can be viewed as analogous to
estates in tail special 89 (i.e., membership is passed along to heirs so long as
each heir has a threshold number of ancestors who were tribal members).
The fee tail analogue is particularly suited to the situation of many
Hawaiians given that several ali'i trusts were created when various lines of
183. A telephone interview with the tribal membership office confirmed that there are
indeed tribal members with even lower blood quanta than 1/512th. Cf. Native American
Roots, Once Hidden, Now Embraced, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2001, at A01 (noting that the
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma has members with as little as 1/4096th Indian blood).
184. Justice Breyer assumed nine generations between 1778 and the present, or ap-
proximately twenty-five years per generation. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 526.
185. The fee tail allows the owner of a property interest to ensure that the property
remains within his family indefinitely. If 0 conveys a fee tail to A, then upon A's death the
property will go to A's heir, then to that heir's heir, and so on. Neither A nor any of A's
decedents may convey the property outside the family line. If they try to do so, then the
property reverts to O's heirs. The property also reverts to O's heirs if A's blood line runs
out. Although uncommon in modern property regimes, some form of fee tail is still en-
forced in Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW § 4.5.3.3 (2d ed. 1997).
186. See BiAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1466 (7th ed. 1999) ("tail female").
187. See id. ("tail male"). The situation of a child with a Navajo father and Pueblo
mother that was therefore unable to inherit membership from either parent was at issue in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
188. The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians restricts enrollment to those whose "direct
lineal ancestor[s] ... appear on the 1924 Baker Roll of the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians [and who] possess at least 1/16th degree of Eastern Cherokee blood." E. BAND OF
CHEROKEE INDIANS, ENROLLMENT INoO, at http://www.cherokee-nc.com/enroll.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2002). See also 25 C.ER § 75.6 (2000) (specifying 1/16 blood quantum
requirement for additions to Eastern Cherokee roll of persons applying for membership
on or after August 14, 1963). Note that other tribes, such as the Comanche, Kiowa, and
Tonkawa tribes, require 1/4 blood quantum for membership. See OKLA. INDIAN LEGAL
SERVs.,TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP, at http://thorpe.ou.edu/OILS/blood.html (Apr. 1998).
189. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 186 ("tail special").
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descendancy from Kamehameha I ended without any heirs."9 These trusts,
such as the Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate,"' the Lili'uokalani
Trust,1 12 the Lunalilo Trust,'93 and the Queen Emma Trust, '94 all hold land
for the benefit of Native Hawaiians.
Another analogue to ancestral requirements for tribal membership is
the "Law of Return" of the State of Israel.'95 Under the Law of Return,
which is facially matrilineal in nature, every Jew has "the right to come to
Israel as an oleh [a Jew immigrating to Israel] and become an Israeli citi-
zen. For the purposes of this Law, 'Jew' means a person who was born of a
Jewish mother ... ,"16 Since 1970 "the right to immigrate under this law
has been extended to include the child and the grandchild of a Jew, the
spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of the grandchild of a Jew"
'197
Descendancy from a Jewish mother or grandmother therefore entitles one
to Israeli citizenship, even if that mother or grandmother is not ethnically
Jewish (such as an Ethiopian Jew). Similarly, lineal descendancy from a
tribal member is the key requirement for tribal membership for many
Indian tribes. In the contexts of Indian law and tribal membership, ances-
try is not a proxy for race.
3.The Dissenting Opinions
Although Justice Stevens' dissent properly identified that a trust re-
sponsibility extends to Native Hawaiians, ' he wrongly interpreted the
Mancari decision as allowing their differential treatment without requiring
tribal membership.'9 The oft-cited footnote twenty-four of Mancari
clearly states that
190. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
191. See MAcKENZIE, supra note 13 at 281-84.
192. See id. at 284-86.
193. See id. at 286-87.
194. See id. at 288-89.
195. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Law of Return 5710-1950, available at http://
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00kpO (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
196. Id. at 5730-1970,§ 4B.
197. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Acquisition of Israeli Nationality, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAHOOmzO (last visited Jan. 28, 2002). Although the
ancestral nature of the Law of Return is quite clear, the analogy breaks down somewhat
because there is a further stipulation that for those that have converted to Judaism, the
right to come to Israel as an oleh is only available to those who are "not a member of an-
other religion." Id. However, for those individuals that fall in the ancestral category,
ancestry alone would seem to be sufficient irrespective of that individual's religion.
198. Rice, 528 U.S. at 532. Justice Stevens also correctly noted the analogue between
Native Hawaiians and the Pueblo Indians. Id. at 530.
199. But see Frickey, supra note 6, at 1762.
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The preference is not directed towards a "racial" group con-
sisting of "Indians"; instead, it applies only to members of
"federally recognized" tribes. This operates to exclude many
individuals who are racially to be classified as "Indians." In
this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in
nature."°
Although Stevens would extend Mancari's scope to encompass Native
Hawaiians as a "racial" group, both the majority and a proper reading of
Mancari would not.
Justice Stevens also misidentified Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v.
Weeks201 for the proposition that tribal membership is not required for
Mancari coverage."' This mischaracterization is not surprising given that
Stevens dissented in Weeks.The issue in Weeks involved the distribution of
an Indian Claims Commission judgment in favor of the descendants of
the historical Delaware Nation.20 3 The Kansas Delawares were excluded
from the distribution because they had "dissolve[d] their relations with
their tribe.'2 0 4 Not comprehending the difference between tribal members
and non-member (but ethnic) Indians, Justice Stevens argued for the in-
clusion of non-member Indians in the distribution of tribal property.
Then, as now, Stevens saw Indian status as racial, not political.
Refuting Justice Breyer's contention that defining a Native Hawaiian
entity based on lineal descendancy from pre-1778 residents is too broad
to be "reasonable," however, Justice Stevens correctly pointed out that
"[flederal definitions of'Indian' often rely on the ability to trace one's an-
cestry to a particular group at a particular time."20 s As an example, he
quoted a Bureau of Indian Affairs regulation defining persons of Indian
descent as "'descendants of such [tribal] members who were, on June 1,
1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reserva-
tion.' "206 Pointing out the flaw in Breyer's argument,Justice Stevens wrote
that "[i1t can hardly be correct that once 1934 is two centuries past, rather
than merely 66 years past, this classification will cease to be 'reason-
able.' "207
Justice Stevens also suggested a property rights conceptualization of
tribal membership in his hypothetical example of "a trust to manage
Monticello ... [where] the descendants of Thomas Jefferson should elect
200. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24
201. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
202. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 532 n.6.
203. See Weeks, 430 U.S. at 75.
204. Id. at 78 (quoting Treaty with the Delaware Indians,July 4, 1866, U.S.-Del.Tribe
of Indians, 14 Stat. 793). See also PRUCHA, supra note 28, at 275, 394.
205. Rice, 528 U.S.at 535-36 n.11.
206. Id. (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 (1999)).
207. Id. See also supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
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the trustees." '8 Invoking Hodel v. Irving,"' Justice Stevens elaborated fur-
ther on the property rights concept in response to Justice Breyer's
problem with fractionated blood quanta:
Indeed, "[i]n one form or another, the right to pass on prop-
erty-to one's family in particular-has been part of the
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times." Even the
most minute fractional interests that can be identified after
allotted lands are passed through several generations can re-
ceive legal recognition and protection. Thus, we held not
long ago that inherited shares of parcels allotted to the
Sioux in 1889 could not be taken without compensation
even though their value was nominal and it was necessary to
use a common denominator of 3,394,923,840,000 to iden-
tify the size of the smallest interest. Whether it is wise to
provide recompense for all of the descendants of an injured
class after several generations have come and gone is a mat-
ter of policy, but the fact that their interests were acquired




Although Justice Stevens alluded to a property rights view of tribal
membership, he did not rely on it to support his argument that there was
no constitutional defect in the OHA voting restriction. Were it not for the
fact that the definitions at issue were facially racial in nature, most of jus-
tice Stevens' dissent is extremely persuasive. His ultimate conclusion,
however, was based on a determination of the appropriateness of classify-
ing Native Hawaiians racially in furtherance of a remedial objective rather
than the inherent residual sovereignty of the Native Hawaiians themselves.
III. EXPLORATION or ALTERNATIVES
In the majority opinion, the Court cited a scholarly debate between
professors Benjamin and Van Dyke."' In that debate, Professor Benjamin
contends that only federally recognized tribes get the benefit of Mancari.
21 2
Professor Van Dyke counters that all "ethnic" aboriginal descendants get
Mancari's benefit; 213 a position which was also argued in Justice Stevens'
208. Rice, 528 U.S. at 545.
209. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
210. Rice, 528 U.S. at 545 n.16 (citations omitted).
211. See id. at 518-19.
212. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship:The Case of
Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE LJ. 537 (1996).
213. SeeVan Dyke, supra note 54,at 95.
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dissent.214 It is likely that both the positive and normative realities lie
somewhere in between. At the moment, however, Native Hawaiians are
less autonomous than Indian tribes because they have no political identity,
and a political identity is necessary if Native Hawaiians are to enjoy a gov-
ernment-to-government relationship with either the state or federal
government." ' As Justice Stevens said, "it is a painful irony indeed to con-
clude that native Hawaiians are not entitled to special benefits designed to
restore a measure of native self-governance because they currently lack
any vestigial native government-a possibility of which history and the
actions of this Nation have deprived them."
21 6
At the core of the Native Hawaiians' defeat is the fact that the reme-
dial infrastructure that was crafted to benefit them was based on a notion
of racial, as opposed to political, identity. The State did not employ the
original statutory concept of "Hawaiian" based on descendancy from the
aboriginal peoples who exercised sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands in
1778. Instead, the State used a race-based definition of "Hawaiian" in or-
der to restrict votes for OHA trustees. It may be permissible for a tribe to
limit voting to members of a certain blood quantum, but the Court held
that it is not appropriate for any state to do so. What, then, could have
been done to give Native Hawaiians the degree of self-determination that
OHA was intended to provide?
One possible solution is that Congress might recognize Native
Hawaiians as a political entity. Native Hawaiians' interaction with state or
federal governments would then be on a government-to-government
basis; because the "validity of the voting restriction ... [was] the only
question before 2 17 the Rice Court, if a Native Hawaiian entity had admin-
istered the trust, there would have been no question at all because only
members of that entity would have been eligible to vote. Justice Stevens'
hypothetical Monticello trust21 is an appropriate analogue to this situa-
tion. As long as the State is not involved in the internal political matters of
the Native Hawaiian entity, the Fifteenth Amendment does not restrict
that entity's internal management or operations.
A bill was introduced by the Hawaiian congressional delegation dur-
ing the 106th Congress that would have created a government-to-
government relationship between Native Hawaiians and the federal gov-
ernment similar to that between mainland Indian tribes and the federal
government.219 Given that the spectrum of opinion on the practical im-
214. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 535.
215. See Trask, infra note 222, at 82-88.
216. Rice, 528 U.S. at 535 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
217. Id. at 521.
218. See id. at 545.
219. The bill was passed by the House but failed to move out of the Senate before
Congress adjourned. See Senators Reintroduce the "Akaka Bill", HONOLULU STAR-BULL.,Jan.
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plementation of Native Hawaiian self-determination is as varied as the
flora and fauna of Hawaii itself,22° the reaction to this bill was mixed. 221 As
one Native Hawaiian activist notes:
The Hawaiian native community is comprised of individuals
with diverse philosophies and political views [that] range
from those who believe it is unrealistic and impractical to
advocate for independence from the United States to those
who refuse to acknowledge that the United States or the
State of Hawaii has any authority over them.
222
22, 2001, available at http://starbuletin.com/2001/01/22/news/briefs.html [hereinafter
Senators Reintroduce the "Akaka Bill"].
220. For example, the membership of the Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory Council
includes, but is not limited to, the following organizations:Trustees of the Office of Hawai-
ian Affairs; Department of Hawaiian Home Lands; Ka Pakaukau; Ka Lahui Hawaii; Ohana
O Hawaii; Pro-Hawaiian-Sovereignty Working Group; Na Kane 0 Ka Malo; Institute for
the Advancement of Hawaiian Affairs; Hawaiian Association of Civic Clubs Political Ac-
tion Committee; Na Oiwi; Council of Hawaiian Organizations; and State Council
Hawaiian Homestead Association. See Act ofJune 26, 1991, No. 301, §11, 1991 Haw. Sess.
Laws 906,909-10.
221. Compare House Passes Native Hawaiian Recognition Bill, AsSOCIATED PRESS NEWS-
wiREs, Sept. 26, 2000, available in WL, APWIRESPLUS (document number not available)
("The measure has caused disagreement among some in Hawaii. Some Native Hawaiians
have complained it gives the federal government too much of a role in the Hawaiian sov-
ereignty process. Many of those critics also advocate Hawaii's secession from the United
States."), with Testimony of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs on S.2899, H.R.4904, Submitted
August 23, 2000, (2000 WL 1594804) ("This legislation provides us with the opportunity
not only to protect current programs for Hawaiians, but to meaningfully address this lin-
gering injustice. As such, it is the first step, but an essential step, on the journey for
Hawaiians towards reconciliation.").
222. Elizabeth Pa Martin, Hawaiian Natives Claims of Sovereignty and Self-Determination,
8 ARiz. J. INr'L & COMP. L. 273, 281 (1991). Native Hawaiian activist Mililani Trask de-
scribed the continuum among sovereignty proponents as follows:
Discussions of Hawaiian sovereignty entail a choice among self-governing
structures: a completely independent Hawai'i under the exclusive or pre-
dominating control of Hawaiians;"limited sovereignty" on a specified land
base administered by a representative council but subject to United States
Federal regulations; legally-incorporated land-based units within existing
communities linked by a common elective council; or a "nation-within-
a-nation" on the model of American Indian nations.
Mililani B.Trask, Historical and Contemporary Hawaiian Sef-Determination:A Native Hawaiian
Perspective, 8 Asuz.J. I rN'L & COMP. L. 77, 88 (1991).Trask was a former "Governor of Ka
Lahui Hawai'i, the Sovereign Nation of Hawai'i" id. at 77, and an OHA board member.
see Christine Donnelly, The Hawaiian Roundtable, HONOLULU STaR-BULL., Mar. 20, 2000,
available at http://starbuUetin.com/2000/03/20/special/storyl.html.) See also Christine
Donnelly, Several Ways to Approach Sovereignty, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Mar. 20, 2000, avail-
able at http://starbulletin.com/2000/03/20/special/story2.html.
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Within this continuum are groups that have indicated that they will
be satisfied with nothing less than a completely independent Hawaiian
nation.2 23 Some sovereignty proponents contend that "the islands were
never legally annexed to the United States and still exist as an independ-
ent country .... [thus] reviv[ing] the Republic of Hawaii."224 Another
"position is that the overthrow of the monarchy was also illegal, [thus]
reestablish[ing] the monarchy."25 Others believe that "Hawaiians never
voluntarily gave up their lands so that the present descendants of the Ha-
waiian people are, as a group, the legal sovereigns of the islands."22 6 Certain
activists have even formed governments2 7 and issued laws, decrees,22 and
constitutions.229
223. See Garry Abrams, The Liberation of Hawaii? 100 Years After the US. Toppled the Is-
lands' Last Monarch, Native Hawaiians Demand Self-Government-or Even Independence, L.A.
TIMES,Jan. 17, 1993, at El ("A small minority advocates total independence, in effect re-
creation of the old kingdom. An even smaller minority has gone on record for total inde-
pendence coupled with expulsion of many non-natives, a position that is given no chance
of success."); Hawai'i United for Liberation and Independence, available at http://
www.huli.org ("Hawai'i, an independent nation-state, is now occupied by a belligerent
power, the United States. Hawai'i is neutral and equal to all nations. Hawai'i's sovereignty
has never been relinquished .... We have come together to form a united front, committed
to the peaceful and non-violent restoration of our independent nation and the liberation
of our lands, resources and people."); Ka Pae'aina o Hawai'i Loa, United Independence State-
ment, Dec. 9, 1999, available at http://www.hawaii-nation.org/united-independence.html
("We, individuals, organizations, and representatives of the nation of Hawai'i, though di-
verse in our various opinions of strategies and pathways to the achievement of Hawaiian
sovereignty, hereby unite in our common voice for the independence of..." Hawaii.).
224. Samuel P King, Hawaiian Sovereignty, HAw. Bj.,July 1999, at 6,9.
225. Id. See also Kingdom of Hawai'i, available at http://www.pixi.com/-kingdom/
(seeking the reinstatement and restoration of the Kingdom of Hawai'i and providing his-
torical, common law, and international documents).
226. King, supra note 224, at 9.
227. Id. According to King:
Dennis "Bumpy" Kanahele has achieved sovereignty already. He has estab-
lished the Independent and Sovereign Nation of Hawaii with himself as
the popularly chosen head of state. He and his followers are legally occu-
pying government land and operating their own version of a Hawaiian
nation. His followers are still few enough not to constitute a threat to the
whole State.
Id. at 11. See also William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Sense ofJustice and the Justice of Sense: Native
Hawaiian Sovereignty and the Second "Trial of the Century", 71 WASH. L. Ray 379 (1996)
(discussing the sovereignty activities of"Bumpy" Kanahele).
228. See, e.g., Proclamation of Restoration of the Independence of the Sovereign Nation State of
Hawaii, Jan. 16, 1994, available at http://www.hawaii-nation.org/proclamall.html. The
Proclamation was promulgated under the guidance of Professor Boyle in response to the
1993 Apology Resolution, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993). See also supra note
223.
229. See, e.g., Hawai'i Constitution, Jan. 16, 1995, available at http://www.hawaii-
nation.org/constitution. html.
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While substantial legal scholarship suggests that Native Hawaiians re-
tain a right of self-determination under international law that supports
their organization as an independent nation,23 0 such an outcome is highly
unlikely-"[s]ecession from the Union will not happen." 1 Some "sover-
eignty advocates recognize that realistically the odds of achieving
independence would be quite small, and that the Native Hawaiian move-
ment is hindered by those who push for so extreme a solution, [instead of
concentrating] on more achievable goals."232 Nonetheless, those who ad-
vocate a more pragmatic approach are not unsympathetic to those seeking
a separate, independent nation; since there is universal agreement that the
independence taken away is the basis for any position on sovereignty.
233
Senator Akaka's legislation' 34 seemed to emanate from the position
advocating the incorporation of Native Hawaiians as a political entity into
the federal Indian law model. On January 22, 2001, Senator Akaka rein-
troduced the bill and predicted its passage. 31 Importantly, the Akaka bill
emphasized the residual sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people rather
230. See, Anaya, supra note 32; Chock, supra note 43; Pa Martin, supra note 222;
O'Malley, supra note 109;Trask, supra note 222;Jon M.Van Dyke et al., Self-Determination
for Nonsef-governing Peoples and for Indigenous Peoples:The Cases of Guam and Hawaii, 18 U
HAW. L. REy. 623 (1996); Lisa Cami Oshiro, Comment, Recognizing Na Kanaka Maolis
Right to Self- Determination, 25 N.M. L. REV. 65 (1995); Taryn Ranae Tomasa, Note and
Comment, Ho'olahui:The Rebirth of a Nation, 5 AsiAN L.J. 247 (1998). One scholar, Profes-
sor Francis Boyle, has devoted particular attention to the formation of the Independent
and Sovereign Nation of Hawaii. See, e.g., Francis A. Boyle, Restoration of the Independent
Nation State of Hawaii Under International Law, 7 ST.THoMAS L. REv. 723 (1995) (analyzing
the Apology Resolution, supra note 104, and concluding that the legitimacy of Hawaiian
sovereignty claims are one of the bill's implications); Professor Believes US. Apology Gives
Hawaiians Right to Nationhood, MAUI PaEss, Jan. 14-20, 1994, available at http://
www.alohaquest.com/archive/profapology.htm (describing Professor Boyle's views on
Hawaiian sovereignty as a result of the Apology Resolution); Affidavit of Francis A. Boyle,
Oct. 20, 1995, available at http://www.hawaii-nation.org/boyleaff.html (discussing how
Professor Boyle came to serve as "Legal Adviser to the Nation of Hawaii"and stating that
Professor Boyle provided "legal advice and counsel to Mr. Kanahele and the citizens of the
Nation of Hawaii concerning the establishment of their state").
231. Trask, supra note 222, at 88.
232. Jeffrey Wutzke, Comment, Dependent Independence:Application of the Nunavut Model
to Native Hawaiian Sovereignty and Self-Determination Claims, 22 AM. INDIAN L. R-EV. 509,
559 (1998).
233. See, e.g., Christine Donnelly, In Wake of Rice vs. Cayetano, What Happens Now?,
HONOLULU STa-BULL., Mar. 20, 2000, available at http://starbulletin.com/2000/03/
20/special/transcript.html.
234. See Senators Reintroduce the "Akaka Bill," supra note 219.
235. See Susan Roth, Hawaii Senators Reintroduce Native Recognition Bill, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE,Jan. 23, 2001 (2001 WL 5104218) ("The lawmakers say ... they remain optimistic
that the bill, exactly the same as last year's version, can pass in the 107th Congress....
Akaka has said he believes the 50-50 partisan split in the Senate and an early reintroduc-
tion will work to the bill's benefit this year."). See also Senators Reintroduce the "Akaka Bill,"
supra note 219. The bill was reintroduced as S.81, 107th Cong. (2001). See CONG. REC.
S338 (daily ed.January 22, 2001).
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than their racial characteristics and established procedures for creating a
roll of Native Hawaiians.236
While many sovereignty advocates bristle at the notion of a congres-
sional determination of an initial membership roll as part of the
reorganization process, the pragmatic reality is that Congress has the au-
236. The relevant portions of S.81, 107th Cong (2001) are as follows:
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
(1) ABORIGINAL, INDIGENOUS, NATIVE PEOPLE- The term 'abo-
riginal, indigenous, native people' means those people whom Congress
has recognized as the original inhabitants of the lands and who exer-
cised sovereignty prior to European contact in the areas that later
became part of the United States.
(6) INDIGENOUS, NATIVE PEOPLE- The term 'indigenous, native
people' means the lineal descendants of the aboriginal, indigenous, na-
tive people of the United States.
(7) NATIVE HAWAIIAN-
(A) Prior to the recognition by the United States of a Native Hawaiian
government ... the term 'Native Hawaiian' means the indigenous, na-
tive people of Hawaii who are the lineal descendants of the aboriginal,
indigenous, native people who resided in the islands that now comprise
the State of Hawaii on or before January 1, 1893, and who occupied
and exercised sovereignty in the Hawaiian archipelago, including the
area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii...
(B) Following the recognition by the United States of the Native Ha-
waiian government ... the term 'Native Hawaiian' shall have the
meaning given to such term in the organic governing documents of the
Native Hawaiian government.
SEC. 7(a) ROLL -
(1) PREPARATION OF ROLL-The United States Office for Native
Hawaiian Affairs shall assist the adult members of the Native Hawaiian
community who wish to participate in the reorganization of a Native
Hawaiian government in preparing a roll for the purpose of the organi-
zation of a Native Hawaiian Interim Governing Council. The roll shall
include the names of the-
(A) adult members of the Native Hawaiian community who wish to
become citizens of a Native Hawaiian government and who are-
(i) the lineal descendants of the aboriginal, indigenous, native peo-
ple who resided in the islands that now comprise the State of
Hawaii on or before January 1, 1893, and who occupied and exer-
cised sovereignty in the Hawaiian archipelago; or
(ii) Native Hawaiians who were eligible in 1921 for the programs
authorized by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (42 Stat. 108,
chapter 42) or their lineal descendants; and
(B) the children of the adult members listed on the roll prepared under
this subsection.
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thority237 and has engaged in similar activities in the recent past. 28 None-
theless, Senator Akaka subsequently introduced a revised version of the
bill239 that omitted mention of a specific reorganization process, because
such a "process must be determined by the native Hawaiian commu-
nity. 240 Yet another version of the bill was introduced, ' 1 incorporating
additional changes22 intended to "make the bill more palatable to political
opponents without sharply limiting the number of Hawaiians served by
the legislation." 2 3 The revised legislation, however, is still not without vo-
cal opposition from some elements of the Native Hawaiian community.2 "
Some participants in the Native Hawaiian sovereignty debate accept that
complete autonomy and independence are unlikely but argue that the
federal Indian law model is inappropriate for Native Hawaiians except
with regards to its concept of self-determination.2 - Others support the
237. See 25 U.S.C. § 163 (1994) ("The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, wher-
ever in his discretion such action would be for the best interest of the Indians, to cause a
final roll to be made of the membership of any Indian tribe....").
238. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 585 (1994) (Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians); 25
U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (Yakima Tribes); 25 U.S.C. § 677 (1994) (Ute Tribe of Utah); 25
U.S.C. § 715 (1994) (Coquille Indian Tribe); 25 U.S.C. § 763 (1994) (Paiute Indians of
Utah). Note that sometimes federal involvement in the establishment of tribal membership
is established in the Code of Federal Regulations. See, e.g., 25 C.FR. § 61.4 (2000) (speci-
fying membership criteria for numerous tribes including Pembina Chippewa, Hoopa
Valley Tribe, and Coquille Tribe of Indians); 25 C.F.R. § 75.1-75.19 (2000) (specifying
membership roll modification procedures for the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians).
239. S.746, 107th Cong. (2001) was introduced on April 6, 2001. CONG. REc. S3757
(April 6,2001).
240. Pat Omandam, Akaka, Inouye change native recognition bill, HONOLULU
STAR-BULL., April 7, 2001, available at http://www.starbuletin.com/2001/04/07/news/
story9.html.As compared to S.81, S.746 "deletes the prescribed reorganization process for
a new native Hawaiian governing entity.The reorganization process was the most contro-
versial part of it because it mandate[ed] how a new Hawaiian governing body was to be
formed." Id.
241. S.1783, 107th Cong. (2001) was introduced on December 7, 2001. CONG. REC.
S12681 (December 7,2001).
242. Several of the differences between S.1783 and S.746 reflect the incorporation of
input from the Bush administration. See Susan Roth, "Native Bill's Foes Uncovered," HONO-
LULU ADvERTISER, Dec. 13, 2001, available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/
2001/Dec/13/ln/lnl7a.html (The revised bill "is not intended to supplant their original
bill but incorporates some changes requested by the Bush administration in ongoing dis-
cussions about the legislation.The significant changes include a change in the definition of
the term "Native Hawaiian." The new version refers only to those who were eligible for
Hawaiian Homes Commission programs in 1921 and their descendants.")
243. Christine Donnelly, "Revamped Hawaiian Bill Aims at Compromise" HONOLULU
STAR-BULL., Dec. 14, 2001, quoting OHA Chairman Clayton Hee, available at
http://starbulletin.com/2001/12/14/news/story7.html.
244. See, e.g., SToPAKAKA.org, Stop The Akaka Bill KU'E! http://www.stopakaka.org.
245. See, e.g., statements of Robin Danner in Donnelly, supra note 233:
Hawaiians deserve and should receive recognition by the federal govern-
ment of our sovereign political status [but political status] can be defined
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development of an altogether different model along the lines of Nunavut
territory, 246 which Canada carved out of the Northwest Territories247 in
1999, or "the situation of the Maori people in New Zealand with their
own territory under their own control and governance." 248 Finally, the
reconciliation discussions resulting from the Apology Resolution 4 9 has
generated discussion on the formation of a Native Hawaiian political en-
in many, many ways. So I don't think that political status should be auto-
matically assumed to be the domestic status of Alaskan natives or
American Indians. I think ... we are deserving of a third classification that
has political autonomy, political status, and autonomy from the state and
federal governments.
Id. See also Trask, supra note 222.
While Ka Lahui Hawai'i seeks inclusion in the federal policy for Indian
self- determination, its position is that Hawaiians are not Indians, are not
entitled to any percentage of the federal Indian budget and should not be
placed under the control of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Ka Lahui
Hawai'i asserts that Native Hawaiians should be allowed to form a feder-
ally recognized nation to exercise jurisdiction over its land free from state
incursion and control, and have jurisdictional powers similar to those of
Indian Nations.
Id. at 89; King, supra note 224,
[K]a Lahui Hawai'i's proposed land base would "be the Hawaiian home
lands now administered by the Hawaiian Homes Commission, plus
approximately 1.6 million acres constituting the 'ceded lands trust: plus
the assets of the private trusts that benefit Hawaiians and which are now
being administered by separate boards of trustees. Their economic base
will be the activity conducted on this land base.
Id. at 10.
246. See generally Wutzke, supra note 232.
247. See e.g., Steven Pearlstein, Canadas Natives Reclaim "Our Land"; Country Has a New
Territory, and Inuit Have New Hopes of Preserving Their Culture, WASH. PosT, Apr. 2, 1999, at
A19.
248. King, supra note 224, at 9.
249. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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tity.25 0 Even this process, however, has generated some opposition from
those who advocate complete independence as a separate nation."'
Whether arguing for the development of a new model or the appli-
cation of the existing federal Indian model, the common objective
remains the establishment of a Native Hawaiian political entity that can
engage in government-to-government relations with the federal and state
governments. Eventually the Akaka bill or some modified variant should
pass, providing for the recognition of a collective political identity of Na-
tive Hawaiians. While their identity realistically will never be as a
sovereign, independent nation on equal footing with the United States,
their organization as a single collective political identity would make way
for the formal exercise of Native Hawaiian Ea over a portion of their
'aina.212 Native Hawaiians deserve more than just federal recognition as a
sovereign entity, but pono2 3 dictates that they deserve at least that much.
250. A report on the reconciliation process between the federal government and Na-
tive Hawaiians, resulting from a series of public meetings between Native Hawaiian people
and federal officials, was issued by the Department of Justice and the Department of Inte-
rior on October 23, 2000. See Dep't of the Interior & Dep't of Justice, From Mauka to
Makai: The River of Justice Must Flow Freely (2000). available at http://www.oha.org/
pdf/report1023fin.pdf. The report recommends that Native Hawaiians should be allowed
to exercise self-determination within the framework of federal law: "As a matter ofjustice
and equity, this Report recommends that the Native Hawaiian people should have self-
determination over their own affairs within the framework of Federal law, as do Native
American tribes"' Id. at 17.
251. See, e.g.,Jan TenBruggencate, "Restore the Kingdom"-Reconciliation Talks Draw 200
Hawaiians on Kauai, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Dec. 6, 1999, available at http://
the.honoluluadvertiser.com/1999/Dec/06/localnews1.html ("Representatives of the fed-
eral government said they cannot give what most Native Hawaiian people who attended a
meeting on reconciliation yesterday said they want: the sovereign Hawaiian nation re-
stored'"); Dep't of the Interior, Comments on Native Hawaiian Draft Report, available at
http://www.doi.gov/nativehawaiians/nhcomments.htm; Dep't of the Interior, Written
Statements Received in Connection with Meetings Held During December 1999 on the Reconcilia-
tion Process Between the Federal Government and Native Hawaiians, available at http://
www.doi.gov/nativehawaiians/pdf/.
252. Land. See MACKENZIE, supra 13, at 305.
253. Justice, or "goodness, uprightness, moral qualities, correct or proper procedure,
excellence." Id. at 308.
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